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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-5533
                                                       
BRIAN ANTHONY DAVIS,
                   Appellant
   vs.
U.S. CONGRESS; WARDEN JAMES SHERMAN
                                                                                      
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 04-00265E)
District Judge: Honorable Sean McLaughlin
                                                                                        
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 21, 2006
Before: SCIRICA, CHIEF JUDGE, WEIS AND GARTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed:  May 9, 2006)
                                              
 OPINION
                                              
PER CURIAM.
Brian Anthony Davis, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at FCI-
McKean, appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction.  In
1994, Davis was convicted by a Texas jury of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
1 Since Davis filed his petition, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005), which applied the Blakely rule to the federal
Sentencing Guidelines, making them advisory rather than mandatory.  As Booker is the
more appropriate precedent for a federal sentencing challenge, we will refer to Davis’s
claim as arising under “Blakely/ Booker.”
2
base and conspiracy.  Davis was sentenced to life imprisonment for the cocaine
conviction and, concurrently, to five years for conspiracy.  Davis’s convictions and
sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.  In 1997, Davis filed a motion to vacate
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The
sentencing court denied that motion, and Davis’s request for a certificate of appealability
was denied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In 2004, Davis filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
in the District Court, challenging his convictions and sentences on due process and equal
protection grounds.  Davis also asserted a claim based on Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004), which held that the State of Washington’s determinate
sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by permitting the
imposition of sentence enhancements based on facts found by a judge, using a less
stringent standard of proof than that used by a jury.1  Over Davis’s filed objections, the
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and dismissed
Davis’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  After a
3careful review of the record, we conclude that the appeal presents “no substantial
question.”  We will, therefore, summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment pursuant to
Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
Section 2255 is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge
his sentence or conviction.  Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974).  We have
held that a federal prisoner can seek collateral relief via habeas corpus under § 2241 in the
rare situation where § 2255's scope or procedure makes it “inadequate or ineffective” to
challenge a conviction or sentence.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir.
1997).  However, this “safety-valve” provision of § 2255 applies only in narrow
circumstances.  See id. at 252.  Section 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely
because the petitioner was denied relief in a previous § 2255 proceeding or is unable to
meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255.  See Cradle v. United States ex
rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). 
Davis contends that his equal protection and due process challenges focus
on Congress’s legislative action in passing the laws under which he was convicted and
sentenced, rather than on his particular convictions and sentences.  See Objections to
Report and Recommendation at 3.  Such claims, Davis argues, are not cognizable in a
motion filed under § 2255 and must be brought via § 2241.  See id.  Alternatively, Davis
asserts that his claims challenge the execution of his sentence, as opposed to its
imposition, thereby making § 2241 appropriate.  See id. at 2.  
Notwithstanding the sweeping language in his constitutional arguments,
2 Davis’s Blakely/ Booker claim also falls outside the “safety-valve”
provision of § 2255, because neither Blakely nor Booker de-criminalized the conduct
underlying Davis’s convictions.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.
2002).
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Davis’s claims clearly embody the “essence of habeas corpus,” as they attack the legality
of his custody and seek to secure his immediate release.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  Further, as the District Court observed, Davis’s claims challenge
the validity and imposition of his sentence, rather than the manner in which it is being
carried out, making them inappropriate for § 2241.  Cf. Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480,
485-86 (3d Cir. 2001).  Finally, we agree with the District Court that Davis is not entitled
to use § 2241 as a vehicle for his Blakely/ Booker claim merely because he would be
barred from raising such a claim in a second § 2255 motion.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538
(“[i]t is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is
determinative”).2 
For these reasons, we agree with the District Court’s refusal to entertain
Davis’s petition.  We will, therefore, summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
Davis’s motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.
